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Regulations make insurance unaffordable
Health care regulations cost Americans $169,000,000,000 per year and make health insurance unaffordable for over 7,000,000 citizens, argues an assistant research professor at Duke University, Raleigh, N.C. The costs of health care regulations outweigh the benefits by two-to-one and induce more deaths each year than the Institute of Medicine estimates are caused by a lack of health insurance.
In "Health Care Regulation: A $169 Billion Hidden Tax," Christopher J. Conover charges that health services regulations cost the average household an estimated $1,546 and roughly one out of six of the average daily uninsured owe their plight to excess regulatory costs. |
"Americans would be better off taking their chances on less regulation and instead saving 22,000 lives for certain by keeping [the $169,000,000,000] in the hands of consumers, thereby enabling them to purchase safer products--cars, homes, etc.--or to make other investments to improve their health."
He suggests that the most promising target for regulatory cost savings is medical liability reform, maintaining that system imposes costs of $113,700,000,000 but provides benefits amounting to just $33,000,000,-000. Conover adds that other ways to reduce excess costs would be to deregulate the Food and Drug Administration, health insurance (e.g., continuation-of-coverage impositions and mandated health benefits), and health facilities (e.g., accreditation and licensure).
"FDA regulation imposes an annual cost on society of $49,000,000,000 and annual benefits of $7,100,000,000. The lion's share of this cost represents the value society places on the lives that are lost while waiting for better pharmaceuticals to be approved [after subtracting the number of lives saved by FDA safety regulations]," Conover concludes. "Continuation-of-coverage mandates, predominantly stemming from Federal regulations, have a net cost of $15,000,000,000, while benefit mandates have a net cost of $13,500,000,000." |
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